The Varieties of Religious Experience 2/15
To define philosophy of religion is no small matter, since ‘religion’ is the name of a concept which collects multiple principals into its essence. Becoming acquainted systematically with the multiple details of religious character makes of its abstract concept an enlightening unity. Though “religion” can be conceived of mentally implies not that it is a manifold type of matter. Thus ‘religious sentiment’ is the abstract idea of objective emotions derived from experience; that is, they are definite states of mind in correlation with a feeling object and “religious emotions” do not form a special category essentially different from other emotions whose whose quality, ‘religion’ in form, guarantees their validity: There is no basis to religion’s passion aside from that of emotional states.
There however remains a gulf between the institutional and personal sides of religion. Formal concerns of doctrine and precsriptions of practice, devotion comprise the former of which their latter involves in the human equation dispositions of attitude, moral and feelings of despair, unfulfillment. These are interpersonal and private between one soul and another, god. The philsophy of religion ought appropriately confine itself to the latter; for this is the sole aspect of religion questionable in terms of its social character (i.e. it isn’t true by definition with reference to its own rules of theological speculation); there’s room for a believer and even one not of their faith to discuss and debate over these experiences.
Beyond a simple morality, the religious subjectivity goes deeper than institutions because spirituality must always function on a personal level of communication with the divine. Sociologically, piety is rooted in cult and magical charm; but these are primal urges of a generally archaic nature. Religion then is, in fact, the actions and states of mind taken individually of people in relation to themselves contemplating ‘what is divine’? This is the source of which theology, philosophy and ideology comes to draw from itself. Since functional definition which temporarily fix a working sense to their term can be useful so long as one recalls their arbitarily assigned value, this religious meaning is not dogmatic. And they can be “religious” but also free from positing traditional ideas of God to exist.
Facts are subject to changing circumstance; the only one that’s not is that certain ideas of them aren’t. Sometimes dualist oppositions are the truth of the matter. They tell me god loves and also justice. Eventually your innate character must reveal itself; apparently because it’s there and you can’t forever hide. If you both are and do right, that is true, attains religious sentiment; jury’s still out on ” highest happiness” [I'll forego requisite pot joke]. These are the defintion of blessedness (which is a more permanent and achievable state than ‘happy’). Certain obligations of right, that of choice, being good and doing great are all a form of the almighty, wisdom and expressions of that fact attain a timeless character so long as they are of pure intent and meaning. Even the muslims dig Christ; not to mention Judaic Christmas Eve [Emerson really was the prototypical American: You have to be as open-minded as zealous, brilliant without really working at it—treat all speech as scripted, your writings like you speak—crazier than a cat in a shithouse, go be highly esteemed]!
Religion as a reaction to life is the sense, beyond existence, to the paradoxical sense of immanent presence everyone possess to a degree. Even seemingly non-religious reactions are often related in such was as to class them religiously, though they—technically speaking—are outside of this category of experience. The stoical sense of pragmatists or rationalism, for example, though including an ethics and an ideology, is similar, though hardly religion. Accordingly there is nothing wrong in disposing oneself to mutually satisfy seemingly contradictory dictates through creatively conceiving of a problem’s particular method of solution. The element of irreverence found in good humour is not improper when oriented to make light of nature’s universal: ’We are resigned in advance to losing the interest on our investments of virtue, but we wish not to appear ridiculous by having counted on them too securely.’
But people do agree ‘religion’ does always intend seriousness in the universality of meaning; the gravity to silence inanity and sharp wit together at once (though no one likes it equally when too weighty and taxing of depressing complaint). “There must be something solemn, serious, and tender about any attitude which we denominate religious.” Divinity does not inspire cursing or jokes.
Trying to systematize terminology of religious understanding distorts the subjective nature of the experience to be learned of empirically. Heirarchy of the holy ought not over-define boundaries “and it is everywhere a question of amount and degree.” They are beyond doubt in dealing with what can only be called as such. But tend to be evidenced more in the extreme instance of complex and touching submission to grace. A matter of personal religion, in fact (though the sentiment is innately human).
At heart, religion and its morality is a matter of accepting the universe (in philosophy, this is a question of determining its conditional existence and modes of representation). Dull submission is forsaken in favor of glad peacefulness of enthusiasm. There do, however, result two general ways of this in application, namely, the detachment of the stoic and the happy suffering of the saint [think of Mason & Dixon]. It’s a critical matter to try and overcome that apparent split. ‘And so accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagreeable, because it leads to this, the health of the universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus.”I choose rather to be a pilgrim upon the earth with thee, than without thee to possess heaven. Where thou art, there is heaven; and where thou art not, behold there death and hell.’ “The essence of religious experiences, the thing by which we finally must judge them, must be that element or quality in them which we can meet nowhere else.” But in the intensity of expression, philsophy and religions come to look indistinguishable: At heart it comes down to energy, its direction and motivations.
The ecstacy of a religious-type rapture, that “is the result of the excitement of a higher kind of emotion,” in whose throes one’s own will ceases to have any valid relevance. The powerless and despairing don’t care much to hear of personal will and trying; they want someone to console with the reassurance that universe’s divine will both knows how to understand and keep you safe. “Well, we are all such helpless failures in the last resort.” True, religious types know the state of mind that is silence in awe’s respect. Not as a continual act of repressing intention, but of relaxing breathes too deep and present meant to last: Without fright.
Emotions. Are. Not. Rational: They’re relational too. They can be analyzed according to their effects, but not ultimately in terms of meaning, means, motivation. “Religious feeling is thus an absolute addition to the Subject’s range of life.” Religion thus is made the dimension of added meaning to emotion; a context which gives their expression form in its power, so to speak: Whose struggle’s end represents our freedom.
Some people, no doubt, are wholly lacking the awareness of this sense; but deep down there is some knowledge of this truth, as this most keen sense—that of human feeling—is present, in degrees, amongst us all. “This sort of happiness in the absolute and everlasting is what we find nowhere but in religion.” Even every culture has some form of worship to unite personal with communality. Laughter can be seen as an outgrowth of this drive. Whenever the response to adversity has taken shape as the expanded form of joy or hope in one’s own soul is the definition of religious. This is not at all purely escapism because it does not deny or ignore the challenges, choosing instead to meet their evil head-on. Perhaps a societal means of preserving life through faith. Religious individuals are not purely all happy and just, rather, they are able to maintain a higher consciousness of fulfillment which moderates a “lower unhappiness” held itself in check. “No other emotion than religious emotion can bring [one] to this peculiar pass.”
If you think that having to consider it in depth such like this makes it mean less, perhaps you might read—again.
en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Varieties_of_Religious_Experience/Lecture_II
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- June 26, 2008 / 6:19 am
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- William James
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