The Varieties of Religious Experience 1/15
“…I hope that our people may become in all these higher matters even as one people; and that the peculiar philosophic temperament, as well as the peculiar political temperament, that goes with our English speech may more and more pervade and influence the world.”
A psychological explanation of the will to religion, in terms of its subject, is best done with reference to those documents prepared by the most accomplished and expressively descriptive authors of the subjective experience to reveal their idea of motivation. Religion and philosophy do not immediately lend themselves to speculation in each other’s logic, either synchronic or historically. But both can be thought of in terms diachronically and of descriptive questions in significance. The former is of a fairly ascertainable, factual nature; the other requires theoretical framework needed to orient its various details observed in order to form a spiritual judgment (rather than the existential one). So they both lend themselves variously to differing forms of judging.
The proper treatment of the matter lends itself to the original feelings experienced which are the foundation for more widespread manifestations of experience, those passionate about their religion. Now any existential examination into the conditions of religion’s experiences must also have recourse to the feelings of the masses. Oftentimes people are averse to seeing an intellectual treatment of something they hold dear; conversely, the intellectualizing mind tends to compare objects as if of a class. This becomes complicated infinitely when handling an object which is both important and unique. From there are causes assigned according to recognizable traits. But people who tend to make things all question of historical origin and existence inspire the contempt of their arrogance—in belief of such as sole cause—as well as that they threaten one’s subjective mental state by means of their constant, equivocal negation in reducing the totality of reality experience to their preferred form.
There are always those who wish to denigrate the sacred and pious by pointing out it comes of humble origins: The psychopaths who killed and torture Christ, for example. Our expressions and metaphors must, especially in abstract matters of religion, derive from somewhere immediate so that, when appropriate, their new sense may be applied to one’s daily life but also spiritually. However, on the supposed link essential to conceptions of religious sentiment as an outgrowth of sexuality, recommended by its novelty; as if one’s spiritual growth were innately akin to that of an adolescent reaching the age of sexual maturity. This elides the mental development of the individual in the formative period. The interpretation of any religion thus occurs within the context of a consciousness of the religious (i.e. it must remain a phenomenological process of empirical affairs).
Mental states are not subject to knowledge like doubtable facts.
In deferring all questions of psychological activity to the facts of organic, testable matter the reduction reaches the absurdity of denying, eventually, in some way we are conscious; or casts doubt on the assertions of sanity for anyone opposed. The simple fact is that existential questions are insufficient for describing answers to metaphysical categories of experience. But pleading all states of mind have a physiological basis, that they therefore cannot be of a great value spiritually or for one’s mind, is to impose arbitrary norms of pseudo-judgment upon a non-commensurate mode of understanding which leads to self-contradiction in the extreme application of negating abstraction. So materialism as well, though useful for ascertaining certain facts, is not the end of truth.
The proper approach for dealing with spiritual subjectivity is always with reference to a pragmatic goal of internal or external description. When these break down or become over-complicated it is best to look at one’s history in order to arrive at a contextual understanding. However, the relegation of any idiosyncrasy to apparent instance of aberrant illness itself misses this point in looking at the behavior and not into its effects in terms of themselves and surrounding facts. Basically, if your theories guiding practicality cause one to draw more inferences than are warranted to explain something which could be discoverable in less complicating, unfamiliar terms—for the sake of logical consistency—one has crossed into delusion in considering that theories and beliefs are the sole constituent element of reality: Those of a mind’s healthy constitution prefer rather to address the statements in argument rather than impugn the mental capacity, neuroses or character of whose arguments one hopes to refute.
Being immediately bright, open-minded and reasonable, helpful but moral—philosophical—are noble enough for theoretical practices.
Because ‘empiricism’ is a kind of theory too. Positivists want best to be right by excluding all error; this is, to be sure, insanity since one is incapable of conceiving all the variable possibilities in complex realife situtations: Just knowing where ‘it‘ comes from, or even how it went before you got there to look at, does not guarantee your conclusions as correct even if you’ve always been right before. The difference of course lies in whether differences are elided to destructive, immediate ends or being addressed sensitively in order to build anew upon foundations from the past. Origins are only relevant in how they work relating to the whole of which they are, admittedly often synecdoche, but a part; hence the affiliation of pragmatism to empiricists. Even DesCartes had problems distinguishing between his genius, an evil one, god’s. But if you believe in Christ, some prophet, even God: I doubt they’ll argue against.
Religious life, assuming adherence to its moral foundation, ought to be judged according to its results, solely. But the capacity to do this with sensitivity to context presupposes comprehension of its existential conditions (i.e. “what set of circumstances made possible development of this faith &/or in this particular way (instead of some contra-factual other)?”). Well, first you’ve got to want to know and next is the totality of picture derived from looking at phenomena in both real and more normative, then prospective modalities—if not, actualities—of deviant or supranormal instances. “To understand a thing rightly we need to see it both out of its environment and in it, and to have acquaintance with the whole range of its variations.”
Especially capable individuals often share many traits common with total psychopaths; but one must not defer to merely facile, metaphorical equivocation in collapsing the distinction: As with religious feeling and philosophical argument; but most schiz’s are not the most particularly penetrating of intellect (the brightest among them are most studied in penetration of a sorts, but in a relentlessly focused way that excludes all but the most immediate, ‘intended’ goal). Sensitive people are extremely susceptible to observation and sentiment, but are often unable to re-assess their assumptions and can persist, for it, in error. Sometimes you get a genuine genius who is also a total and raving nutbag; ol’ W.J. here seems to suggest these are the types most likely to make it on A & E – Biography. Maybe he’s advertising his wiki-?
One might claim all religious experience is derived from a mass delusion, even if God were to come down and approve some faith or belief.—since that’s basically what Christians say was done. It is impossible for any mortal creation to conceptually encompass the entire universality of Truth. You have to be a little crazy to have emotions and perceive, observe moral standards because these are non-logical; so if every other aspect of life is based around some locus of rationality, you’re going to end up pretty far off from either of those. They may even be the a-rational foundation of the love for ideas or of that which is beyond physicality (metaphysics) and the nature of religious experience (mysticism): You have to use your neuroses to get around themselves. A wider concept of context is most salutory toward that end.
en.wikisource.org/wiki/The_Varieties_of_Religious_Experience/Lecture_I
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- June 25, 2008 / 12:49 am
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- William James
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