Intensional Semantics

Literally, the only way I can make sense of this as relevant to natural languages is should one adopt as analogy the difference between langue/parole in Saussure (not like he’s the only one, but…) in conceptualizing the relation between logistic system and formalized language; the first is pure systematic and pre-determinate, though unapplied in fixing an interpretation. The latter is the application of this by which its expressions acquire the sense of meaning.

So for the actual system of a language (pushing it a bit here) requires: 1) A vocabulary classifying its symbols needed for 2) rules of formation which stipulate the quality of expressions, including that of an expression sufficiently well-formed to constitute a sentence. 3) There must be a set of guidelines for inferring a conclusion from a particular assertion of a sentence’s premises. 4) Which entails that some of these are foundational ["Certain asserted sentences, the axioms (exist)."]

So, if you want to formalize this into an actual application of linguistic usage (accepting an Analytical equivocation here, assuming one can), syntactical and semantical rules are required for the logistical system and its expressions, respectively. ‘Meaningul’ is not always an instance of well-formed,—this is where trouble begins: “The character of the semantical rules will depend on the theory of meaning adopted, and this in turn must be justified by the purpose it will serve.” So let’s assume that everyday linguistic communication is based on an idealized ‘norm’ (the Bostonians perk up) of which all its instances function imprecise approximation: Has to be able to handle what’s real, as a belief, levels of modal reality; or relate them (in theory) to some other terminology. There should be some way to solve apparent paradoxes.

Here’s the deal: In going from a purely analytical (i.e. universally valid) proposition, such as Tarski’s (or even Searle’s scholastically imperial taxonomies) there has to be a theoretical means of mediation between empirically verifiable and pure abstraction; for JRS, it’s a highly controversial synthesis of formal discourses borrowed from the sciences in the style of pragmatism; with a lovely style of prose. Frege’s deal was an innovative, but nascent (bested by Saussure), catalog of basic linguistic and grammatical structures. Basically, there must be a series of notations which take their meaning relationally in expression; but all ‘notations’ do this to a certain extent. Collapsing them into naming and forms help mitigate their totality.

A name, even one of an object or noun, has its most clearly defined sense,—the denotation. included in its meaning is, of course, the practical relations of metaphorical sense which are acquired through usage and can never be booked, in the present, into anything that could be rigorously called a precept: This is why hermeneutics is indispensible in conceptualizing reality, but wholly irrelevant to pure research applications in philosophy of language. “Thus anything which is or is capable of being the sense of some name in some language, actual or possible, is a concept.”

The actual form is the distinction between these two conceptual functions which allow an analysis to proceed.

Now where peeps start getting their noodle twisted is in forgetting that the original distinction bears to essential validity in truth; it is purely an arbitrary division based on convenience to make apprehended the range of concept values assignable to an abstract potential for meaning made definite. As relates to the self-referential, but valid (analytic, but I didn’t read my Kant that well), definition of a word (assuming the nominalist interpretation), every formal system (included: Concept of ‘human language’) has an actually assigned truth value for every corresponding system possible in fixing its variable terms. That is, different theoretical systems imply each other in fact and actual discursive applications can be made to correspond in theory: But it’s really a pain in the ass (like Hawking with his galaxies and quarks—charming!).

There’s also this crap here on sense value which is too technical for me and I’m told irrelevant to natural languages. For ‘common’ usage, one assumes that these are the same in denotation and leave it that.

www.ditext.com/church/nae.html