Link Between Philosophy, Religion, Ideology

Philosophy, as a universal concept, lacks the norms of behavior found in religion and, as such, is shared between the two a distance of ideology composed in their unity as difference which separates the action and its means (the ideal motivation): The historical dimension in philosophy and the opposable unification of religious discourse point to a reversability of shared theoretical aims and practical concerns, neither of which are equal, nor immediately reducible, to each others’ terminology. Since Marx, the general tenor of philosophy has taken a decidedly pragmatic view in conceptualization abstract relations of exchange which has occupied nearly all of its fields. Perhaps nowadays, more as a reactionary move from the adverse parroting of philosophizing jargon towards a dialectic approaching representative and factual abstraction,—a matter of brandishing philosophical argumentation by which one might repudiate itself as conducted in order to redress the basis of what one is seeking to negate—exists.

The link between philosophy’s idealized mediation between theory and practice, in comparison with the religious guidance of morality’s conduct prescribed by a spiritual word-view, serves merely—to be real—as confirmation of historical materialism in terms of its continually irruptive presence. True, the historical weight of the past is, to a degree, ever re-present; but also requires a consistent activity of contemplating roots of its foundations as acts of cognition in more than purely academic terms. This leads one to formulate propositions of mass culture supposedly universal in terms of a more generally contextualized awareness of their societal situation: The function of a unified political knowledge. Pragmatics, then, the philosophy of acted, in being a method of negotiating philosophical and historical considerations, must be derived from a speculative concept of the universe. But, of course, one realizes the inevitability of following along such a course leads always either from the already concrete to classifiable generalization, or reformulates in abstractions of words the progressively empirical acquisition of knowing as a means to end of higher thought about action.—a retranslation

You might look at the greater degree of perception’s precision that experience affords hands on, for example—continentalists’ theories, as more consequential in refuting particular methods of study one considers the problematic inheritance of a present left flawed by historically manifest; as if that weren’t the sole philosophical problem. The ones which lend themselves to being solved through thinking and talking, i.e. those which are determined through philosophy and solved by doing it, these are the ones to stamp with a[ PRIORITY ] and, in reflecting on the fully conceivable magnitude of their social and ethical scope, one guides them to solution in the birth of their final analysis before taking action. One of course understands the full weight of reality, even philosophically speaking, is so broadly definable a concept as to involve some degree of precision in formulation of terms. That’s why the practical tendencies and social effects of categorization and class (which these philosophers comprise) were uncovered as the materialist interpretations of the 18th Century which oriented fully toward the present moment, that is, towards commodification and its use; with Hegel, it’s (e.g.) the Prussian state; for Feuerbach, ideas of modern life by which German culture became debased; in Stirner, the sellers’ soul; Schopenhauer, that of middle-class management and so on & forth.

Historicizing given philosophies as the pursuit of connection between their subsequent meanings: Truth, but not solely in terms of analysis by which one explicates a philosopher’s labor in its social context. One must situate this claim as a cognitive justification. Social and historical are arguable, terms to be designated according to a realife practice. Doesn’t have to be arbitrary or momentous; but it should estimate the worth of a trace in developping, which may not be what its importance first seemed, if the problem had been posed as if meaningless or conspiratorial. Historical utility then might be conceived by your making wisdom conjectures of a deeply individual, but selfless, endeavor expressing the fact of a philosophical logic in the idiomatic terminologies of one’s own personality. So long as we’re free to consider unencumbered their importance. It’s never purely to an end or get by. It is a given ‘true’ which philosophical speculation develops not in isolation from other philosophies, but in departing from a proposed historical method as a continuous means to re-establishing the provability of solution.—(you don’t get to ignore former relevants that takes precedence). Sometimes these get polemical against previous, or proponents of previous, systems of thought (at which point is useful to locate a subjective interpretation’s truth should it have followed from a foregoing proposition). Because it’s by a force which develops through insinuation of a particular process that a given branch of science is to be co-operation made knowledge.

By all means it seems the theoretical link between analysis and critique, their obverse reflection of the century last, does—as Croce thought and Gramsci believed—supplant the entire field of Philosophy. The history of philosophy, philosophy’s history—history is philosophy—developments as a general narrative of the world’s story, those of the people living on it; this is not because a better theory or practice always takes over from improving on the last. What is clear here is that, in working pragmatically towards Historicism, an implicit form of philsophical discovery and a patently explicit formal discourse is made to elaborate—in coherent matter—some manner of uplifting recognition in the problems of knowledge and daily life so that eventually an abstract and aesthetic form for intellectual efforts may be found in giving way to a more spantaneous kind of accepted, normative sense that these be the agents of a historical type of change. Aesthetes and the star-struck don’t get this for they’re posing questions always stricken dumb by their ‘wow’, but simply reducing everything to physicality, or making “universal” mean all things to abstraction (including counts) is rather uncouthe and silly; however, assuming everything must immediately lend itself to explanation pre-ordained to follow rules as if some board game or legalese of format’s use is equally obtuse: The Marxists’ religion, like that of capitalism, takes its cues from an overemphasis on the economic and equivocation into all other spheres of life. Religion itself is not just enough to rectify these gross and totalitarian inadequacies and philosophy, in itself, leaves very little reason not devenir un suicidaire. But I s’pose that question of how interprets one to study terms.

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