On the Relation of Universals and Particulars

Metaphysical dualism, likely absolute, is clearly not conclusively so. One ought to start from an undifferentiated whole and by sorting out definitions. Objectifying acts of perceptions as different from concepts show the latter are particular entities, the former as considered universal. Making psychological distinctions, as such, is arbitrary since inextricable from the act of cognition. Finite existence is the telling characteristic, however, as perceptions have temporal extension and the objects of conception does not involve this (though these are both conceivably reducible to each others’ terms). As for physical objects in space, there are those which are non-pysical, some that are unique in the physical manifestation of their being and those which are in multiple places simultaneously. So these psychological, (meta)physical distinctions lead logically to relation and the state of its non-existence (such as irrelevance, if not disinterest). There are also relations of identity (subject) and that of predication (metaphorical relation). Therefore in action, all predicative relations referred back to a subject identified as such—even if the object referred to is another concept—is always a conceptual relation which could or might not relate. One might think the only individual things are subjects in isolation; but with no relation to distinguish, the actual nature of the identity proposition cannot be determined as finite or universal. Objective analysis and categorization according to existence in space and time demonstrate how logically this question gets tied in with the multiple facets of the issue under examination. Common sense is a negotiated position between objectivity and subjective speculation held most common (but possibly deceptive or non-perceptible to traditional sensibilities). Just reproducing the visible effects isn’t subtitution for the fact. Knowledge’s representation of the ‘real’ is never ultimate. Empiricism and intuitive speculation end up either denying relation or identity. One or its either accepts universals, while the other accepts universality, but as particulars (either way, you’ll never get to the end of it). Universal qualities can be substituted by likenesses of relation between particulars, but as relates to the particular relation of objects, it pre-supposes their existence and merely restates the original proposition.

www.hist-analytic.org/Russelluniversals.pdf