Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences

Delivered at Johns Hopkins University during the fall of 1966 to close a conference ostensibly held for promoting the ushered in-auguration of ‘Structuralism’ (the idea that there is a certain, fixed way that things are which only your advanced degree can both uncover and guarantees) in the United States, as a testament to the interminably American preference to go on ahead and jump to that next step up before you get too far into the introduction of which previous one you’re on, Derrida’s noted essay—famed for its reciprocal logically, playfully rhetoric in exploration as academia’s essentialist notions of truth relating to fields of humanistic inquiry—is a bit of a teaser to unwind. The argument, which mirrors later debates that sought to din up and pin down the “actually” nature of difference between artistic/intellectual movements (and their relation as such) in the first and latter half of the twentieth century, centers around the distinction between culture and essence in the works of a noted French anthropologist, stating the basic dichotomies which comprise the heart of the structuralist enterprise had themselves superceded and imply a wholly unprecedented process of critical analysis rather than more traditional, formal methods… the idea of structure itself would entail a basic set of assumptions which require its notion is self as the primary method for discovering truth be assumed irrefutably irreducible; due to their privileging of a central presence which guarantees its meaning as fact, a system which is not fixed in determining its own organizations was previously unthinkable. But by defining what is permissible from within under the realm of truth in act, traditional means of organization create an ‘outside’ region which is excluded as less relevant to the central focal point. Therefore, development could be real and only a process of substituting one organizational principle for an-other (which breaks down if the method be refer-red/ing to(o) reciprocally its own definition). The concept of an organized, but centerless, construction becomes practically impossible to consider usefully either when one discusses particular, objective events in terms of themselves (analytic) but in deference to the totality of an entire systematic approach (synthesis) as different’s: This is the reason scientific principles, when applied to human populations, become complicated to infinity when one seeks to relate them to systems which exchange. Forms of knowledge obviously entail principles derived reciprocally from their own use of terms. Traditional approaches to scientific methods necessarily implicate themselves in a word war between opposing terminologies which seek to decide their outcome in favor of objectively determinable, binary oppositions. However, outside of controlled environments, i.e. in “the real world,” the specific terms selected—not only might they have multiple meanings which one can catalog, categorize, relate back to their fairly stable designation—but entail an entire history of their usage and development which can never be fully and objectively realized to a universally accepted level of certainty. Either that or dumb people disagree. That we communicate with words in statements which are agreed to generally refer to particular concepts as things (statements, ideas, images; if not actual, g-nomes) is not nearly so troublesome as the difficulties arising out of attempts to negate, falsify or deny the possibility that agreed upon terms retain some trace of the histories in their use,—particularly unforeseen associations—even entire disruptions which can lead to the opposite conclusion of what one had factually set out to prove. This is why it is always a preferable idea too, in addition to making sure you look up those words, pay extra careful attention to as many relevant instances as can be located in one’s own experience as they are evidenced to have been used. Sometimes, though they may be, seem without visible use and at others demonstrate the impossibility of total comprehension—one never knows,—you just might get eventually lucky and find that one example you had thought could be there and really just needed to see: For yourself. And then go show whoever else didn’t seem that bored to listen on your way down the hall. If it comes to a question of which particular choice to choose, your recommendation ought, may-be “take as many seem appropriate” without concern of incarceration and/or losing job: If this is of no concern to you probably shouldn’t be reading about Derrida.

Oh yeah!, one last thing: If you can’t find that one exampled sample you thought must have had to’ve been there, and you start acting weird (also when other people you love &/or who are in charge tell you to give it up and stop) to keep going is the selfsame definition of madness or it’s genius: In the highly likely event you fit the profile of neither those, it’s almost always already a good idea that you stop, take a walk—go grab a sandwich and a cup of joe—nor decide whether to let it go.

http://www.hydra.umn.edu/derrida/sign-play.html 
http://www.jacquesderrida.com.ar/frances/structure.htm